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Background. Tracing of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) transmission chains is still a major 
challenge for public health authorities, when incidental contacts are not recalled or are not perceived as potential risk contacts. Viral 
sequencing can address key questions about SARS-CoV-2 evolution and may support reconstruction of viral transmission networks 
by integration of molecular epidemiology into classical contact tracing.
Methods. In collaboration with local public health authorities, we set up an integrated system of genomic surveillance in an urban 
setting, combining a) viral surveillance sequencing, b) genetically based identification of infection clusters in the population, c) integration 
of public health authority contact tracing data, and d) a user-friendly dashboard application as a central data analysis platform.
Results. Application of the integrated system from August to December 2020 enabled a characterization of viral population 
structure, analysis of 4 outbreaks at a maximum care hospital, and genetically based identification of 5 putative population infection 
clusters, all of which were confirmed by contact tracing. The system contributed to the development of improved hospital infection 
control and prevention measures and enabled the identification of previously unrecognized transmission chains, involving a martial 
arts gym and establishing a link between the hospital to the local population.
Conclusions. Integrated systems of genomic surveillance could contribute to the monitoring and, potentially, improved man-
agement of SARS-CoV-2 transmission in the population.
Keywords.  genomic epidemiology; infection chain; community transmission; rapid sequencing; Nanopore sequencing.
Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-
CoV-2), a pandemic coronavirus first detected in late 2019 
[1, 2], has infected >135 million individuals and led to >2.9 
million associated deaths [3]. Until the wide availability of 
vaccines, non-pharmaceutical interventions to limit SARS-
CoV-2 transmission will continue to play an important role in 
pandemic management. The specific source of SARS-CoV-2 
infections during community transmission, however, often 
remains unknown even in public health systems that operate 
effective contact tracing regimes (eg, for around 40% of cases 
in the city of Düsseldorf; Düsseldorf Health Department 
internal data).
Genomic epidemiology [4, 5], that is, the application of 
modern genomic technologies to characterize viral transmis-
sion chains [6–10], can crucially contribute to the design and 
evaluation of viral containment strategies. Its possible applica-
tions include the targeted investigation of putative outbreaks, for 
example, in hospitals [11] and care homes, as well as untargeted 
“surveillance sequencing” to monitor transmission dynamics 
and viral evolution in the population at large [12–16]. In an 
integrated genomic epidemiology approach, the joint analysis 
of surveillance, outbreak, and contact tracing data can enable 
the improved analysis of infection chains in the population and 
healthcare settings [17].
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In summer 2020, we established and tested a fully integrated 
SARS-CoV-2 genomic epidemiology system in Düsseldorf, the 
capital of North Rhine Westphalia, a city of about 600 000 in-
habitants in Germany’s largest metropolitan area. Our approach 
combined untargeted longitudinal surveillance sequencing, im-
plemented in collaboration with a large commercial diagnostic 
laboratory, analysis of putative SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks from the 
city’s largest hospital, the integration of local public health au-
thorities, and the development of a user-friendly dashboard to 




Surveillance sample collection was implemented in collabora-
tion with the local diagnostic laboratory Zotz | Klimas, the lar-
gest commercial SARS-CoV-2 testing laboratory in Düsseldorf. 
A convenience sampling approach, arbitrarily targeting 20 – 30 
samples per week with Ct value <32, was implemented; sample 
selection was typically carried out on a single day and no meta-
data were used to determine sampling choices. Selected samples 
were shipped to the Institute of Virology at the Heinrich Heine 
University for amplification.
Outbreak Sample Collection
Samples from outbreaks at Düsseldorf University Hospital were 
collected by local clinical staff and the employee health department 
and sent to the Institute of Virology at the University Hospital of 
Düsseldorf, which is responsible for diagnostic testing of patients and 
staff. All 4 putative SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks identified by the hospital’s 
hygiene staff between September and December 2020 are included in 
this article. Outbreak samples were sequenced locally on the Oxford 
Nanopore platform or externally in collaboration with SeqIT GmbH 
(Kaiserslautern, Germany); see Supplementary Table 2.
Sequencing and Assembly
Full sequencing and assembly protocols for Nanopore and 
Illumina are specified in Supplementary Text 3. Nanopore 
sequencing was based on the Artic protocol [18–20].
Quality Control and Isolate Assembly Inclusion Criteria
All consensus sequences with >3000 undefined (“N”) characters 
were classified as low quality and excluded from all further ana-
lyses, leading to the exclusion of 21 surveillance isolate assem-
blies (pre-filtering: 341 surveillance assemblies; post-filtering: 
320 surveillance assemblies). For the remaining isolates, higher 
Ct values are associated with increased numbers of “N” charac-
ters (Supplementary Figure 5).
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Figure 1. Integrated genomic surveillance in the Düsseldorf area. Population surveillance sequencing enables the characterization of local SARS-CoV-2 population struc-
ture, facilitating the discrimination between clonal hospital outbreaks (here: putative outbreak 1) or simultaneously detected but unrelated SARS-CoV-2 hospital ward cases 
(here: putative outbreak 2). Viral population surveillance data can also enable the de novo identification of infection clusters in the population based on the genetic data. 
Added value of genomic surveillance is maximized when genetic data are integrated with complementary epidemiological data or approaches, such as contact tracing or 
hospital outbreak data. Utilization of viral genetic data by diverse stakeholders is facilitated by providing a user-friendly real-time web application (“dashboard”) for analysis 
and visualization of the generated viral genomes. Abbreviation: SARS-CoV-2, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2.
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Clade Assignment and Variant Calling
Sample clades, variants and other summary statistics were com-
puted with the NextClade tool of NextStrain [21]. Pangolin 
(https://github.com/cov-lineages/pangolin) was used to screen 
for the presence of B.1.1.7 and B.1.351.
SARS-CoV-2 Dashboard Application
The implementation of the SARS-CoV-2 dashboard web appli-
cation is described in Supplementary Text 4 and visualized in 
Supplementary Figure 6.
Phylogenetic and Minimum Spanning Tree Analyses
Details of phylogenetic and minimum spanning tree analyses 
are described in Supplementary Text 3.
Identification of Putative Population Infection Clusters
Putative infection clusters in the surveillance sequencing data 
were identified by greedily clustering all isolate genomes with 
edit distance 0, using the dashboard distance matrix (see above), 
and filtering for clusters with ≥4 members. All candidate clus-
ters were manually inspected.
Integration of Contact Tracing Data
We integrated contact tracing and case information data 
available at and collected by Düsseldorf Health Department 
(Gesundheitsamt Düsseldorf). All personally identifiable infor-
mation remained at Düsseldorf Health Department.
RESULTS
Genomic Surveillance in the Düsseldorf Region
In collaboration with a local diagnostic lab and employing a 
convenience sampling approach, we obtained 320 high-quality 
SARS-CoV-2 viral isolate genomes from samples collected in 
Düsseldorf between August and December 2020 (median: 19 
samples/week). The collected genomes represented 3.1% of 
10  276 newly diagnosed polymerase chain reaction (PCR)-
confirmed cases during the sampling period; the proportion 
of sequenced cases on a weekly basis varied between 0% and 
20% (Supplementary Table 1), and complete or near-complete 
dropout due to challenges with sampling logistics during 
periods of high incidence was observed for 3 weeks in Fall 
2020 (Supplementary Table 1). During the last 4 weeks of the 
sampling period, the proportion of sequenced cases stabilized 
between 2% and 3%. Sequencing data, sample metadata, and as-
sembly quality are summarized in Supplementary Tables 2 and 3. 
By sample genome inclusion criteria (see Methods), all in-
cluded isolate genomes were of high quality (<3000Ns). In total, 
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Figure 2. Local development of SARS-CoV-2 from September to December 2020. A, Newly diagnosed (red line) and sequenced (blue bars; by sample collection week) cases 
of SARS-CoV-2 by calendar week of 2020 in Düsseldorf. Horizontal bars indicate sample collection times for 4 hospital outbreaks on different wards (A–D) of Düsseldorf 
University Hospital. B, Sequenced samples by sample origin. C, Clade composition of surveillance samples by sample collection week, using the NextStrain [21] color scheme. 
D, Substitutions per sequenced surveillance sample and sample collection line; each dot represents one viral genome, blue line: linear fit. Abbreviation: SARS-CoV-2, severe 
acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2.
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one ambiguous character (average: 0.48 ambiguous characters 
/ genome), indicating potential intra-patient strain variability.
The development of viral population structure was largely 
consistent with the developments in Europe at large; for ex-
ample, although clade 20E was initially found at low frequen-
cies, it accounted for nearly half of the sequenced genomes 
towards the end of the sampling period (Figure 2C, Figure 
3A). One notable exception was the absence of clade 20I/501Y.
V1 (equivalent to B.1.1.7/“Alpha” in Pangolin nomenclature; 
https://github.com/cov-lineages/pangolin), which had already 
reached significant frequencies in some European countries by 
the end of December 2020 (eg, 48% in the UK or 15% in the 
Netherlands); the viral variants B.1.351/“Beta,” first identified in 
South Africa, and P.1/“Gamma” were also not detected. A com-
parison between the locally generated data and 385 109 non-
Düsseldorf samples from GISAID [23] showed that many of 
the detected isolate genomes were not yet represented in global 
databases (see Supplementary Table 4 and Supplementary Text 1 
for details).
SARS-CoV-2 Dashboard
To enable the independent interrogation of viral sequencing 
data by all involved stakeholders, we developed a user-friendly 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3. A, Phylogenetic tree of the 320 surveillance samples collected during this study; colours are assigned according to the NextStrain [21] clade system. B, Joint 
phylogenetic tree of 44 samples from 4 hospital outbreaks (Ward A–D) and 320 surveillance samples. For a description of the outbreaks, see main text. Putative population 
infection clusters are highlighted in yellow (1–5). Gaps in the corresponding shaded areas correspond to related samples not identified by the greedy clustering algorithm (see 
Methods). Tree visualization based on iTol [22]. C, Minimum spanning tree (calculated with the Python library networkx version 2.5; visualized with Cytoscape version 3.8.2 
and Inkscape version 0.92) visualization of the 4 hospital outbreaks, including all identical or near-identical (distance = 0 or distance = 1) from GISAID and the surveillance 
sequencing cohort. Samples from GISAID are labelled with their country of origin (Lux = Luxemburg; Net = Netherlands; Swi = Switzerland; Eng = England). The large gray 
circle represents a cluster of identical and near-identical GISAID samples. Solid lines without number indicate distance = 1 and dashed lines indicate distance = 0 between 
samples. Abbreviation: SARS-CoV-2, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2.
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hhu.de and https://covgen.hhu.de/paper for the version 
used here). The dashboard was continuously updated with 
sequenced population and outbreak isolate genomes and en-
abled the targeted development of hypotheses about the genetic 
structure of outbreaks or transmission chains by hospital hy-
giene staff or local health authorities. Inter-sample genetic relat-
edness was visualized using a minimum spanning tree (MST), 
and the interface supported various filtering and visualization 
options, for example, enabling the targeted display of outbreaks 
and genetically related samples from the local viral population 
(Supplementary Figure 2). During the sampling period, the 
dashboard was a key tool to assist the interrogation of the ge-
netic structure of the sequenced viral genomes.
Hospital Outbreak Analysis
We used the developed integrated system to characterize 
the genetic structure of 4 SARS-CoV-2 hospital outbreaks 
at Düsseldorf University Hospital and to search for putative 
transmission chains connecting the local population to the 
hospital. For 3 of 4 characterized outbreaks (Wards A, B, and 
C), sequencing (Supplementary Tables 2 and 3) confirmed the 
clonal structure of the outbreaks (Figure 3B, Figure 3C) within 
15 to 32 days (Supplementary Table 3, Supplementary Text 2), 
but no links between the outbreaks and the local viral popula-
tion were identified. Infection control and prevention measures 
that were put into place included staff re-training, improved 
room ventilation, and upgrades to patient protective equip-
ment; a detailed description of the outbreaks and improved 
hospital infection control and prevention measures is given in 
Supplementary Text 2.
For 1 outbreak (Ward D) that affected 16 patients and 13 
healthcare workers in mid-December, sequencing confirmed 
the clonal nature of the outbreak and identified 2 potential links 
between the outbreak and the local population (Figure 3C); 
first, analyzed sequencing data were available within 26 days 
after the detection of the outbreak. For a detailed analysis of 
the outbreak samples in the context of the Düsseldorf surveil-
lance data, we split the outbreak samples into 2 subgroups. 
Subgroup-01 represented the majority viral type of the out-
break, and all samples within Subgroup-01 were genetically 
identical; Subgroup-02 represented samples with a distance 
(see Supplementary Text 1) of 1 single-nucleotide polymor-
phism (SNP) to Subgroup-01. An analysis of the surveillance 
data showed that the viral type of Subgroup-01 was present 
in the local population as early as 1 October (sample Z164; 
distance to majority of outbreak samples  =  0) and that the 
viral type of Subgroup-02 was detected again in the surveil-
lance data, although the outbreak was ongoing (sample Z794, 
sampled on 16 December). Contact tracing data collected 
by Düsseldorf public health authorities showed that a family 
member of the individual that sample Z164 was taken from 
was treated at another ward of the clinical department of 
Düsseldorf University Hospital in October 2020, establishing 
a possible link between the surveillance samples and the hos-
pital outbreak on ward “D”; a SARS-CoV-2 antibody test of 
this family member was weakly positive for immunoglobulin 
A  (IgA). Contact tracing data also showed that a close rela-
tive of the individual who provided sample Z794 was treated 
at a coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) ward of Düsseldorf 
University Hospital, to which SARS-CoV-2-positive cases 
from ward “D” had been transferred to. Interestingly, 5 highly 
related isolates, identical (distance  =  0) to samples part of 
the ward “D” outbreak, were also identified in Switzerland 
(GISAID IDs 796188, 728868, 737730 768145, 737914; sam-
pled between 9 November and 28 December). Near-identical 
samples (distance = 1) were also found in the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom (Supplementary Table 4). Implemented 
infection control and prevention measures included com-
prehensive screening, a temporary stop of admissions to the 
ward, and re-education of staff in nonpharmaceutical interven-
tions. Further details on the Ward D outbreak are presented in 
Supplementary Text 2.
Genetically Based Identification of Population Infection Clusters
To evaluate whether untargeted surveillance sequencing 
data could enable the genetically based identification of in-
fection clusters and transmission chains in the population 
during community transmission, we applied a simple greedy 
clustering algorithm (Methods) to the viral sequence sur-
veillance data, identifying groups of genetically identical 
samples. This analysis identified 5 putative infection clusters 
within the Düsseldorf samples (Figure 3B; Supplementary 
Table 5). Routine public health authority contact tracing 
data were subsequently integrated and showed that the 
identified clusters reflected epidemiologically relevant 
associations.
PopClust#1 consisted of 7 patient samples collected in late 
August; contact tracing data revealed that this cluster corres-
ponded to a known transmission event during a school excur-
sion in August 2020.
PopClust#2 consisted of 6 patient samples collected in mid-/
late September; of these, 3 were linked via a care home, 2 were 
collected from members of the same family, and the remaining 
sample was linked to an otherwise unrelated primary school 
outbreak.
PopClust#4 and PopClust#5, consisting of 4 and 5 patient 
samples collected in November and December, respectively, 
contained samples that were linked via joint household mem-
bership, as well as samples without any obvious connections to 
the identified households.
Finally, investigation of PopClust#3, representing five sam-
ples collected in early October, enabled the discovery of a 
previously unrecognized population transmission chain. For 
samples Z132 and Z177, a reanalysis of the originally collected 
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contact tracing data pointed to a connection between the cases 
involving another positively tested individual X (not part of the 
study): (Z132, X) were connected via active membership of the 
same martial arts gym, and (X, Z177) had a close personal re-
lationship. Z132 and X had not identified each other as direct 
contacts; the identified putative link between Z132 and X was 
further supported by the timing of the infections and highlights 
the potential for fomite and/or aerosol transmission in mar-
tial arts contexts. Two additional samples of PopClust#3 were 
members of the same household, and for the remaining sample 
in PopClust#3, no obvious connection to the other samples was 
identified.
Sample ID and contact tracing information for the identified 
clusters are summarized in Supplementary Table 5.
Rapid Nanopore Sequencing Experiment
To investigate whether a rapid viral surveillance sequencing 
workflow could be implemented, we measured total turna-
round time for 24 samples with different cycle threshold (Ct) 
values (range 17–31) from the surveillance cohort from sample 
receipt to bioinformatic analysis when using streamlined work-
flows and processes (Supplementary Text 3). After a total time 
of 28 hours (11 hours for sample and library preparation, 15 
hours for sequencing, and ≤2 hours for bioinformatic analysis; 
Supplementary Figure 3), 19 of 24 genomes were resolved to 
high quality (<3000  N positions; Supplementary Figure 4A). 
Increasing the sequencing time by at least 2 hours increased the 
number of high-quality resolved genomes to 20; the number 
of resolved bases across all samples saturated after 37 hours of 
sequencing (Supplementary Figure 4B).
DISCUSSION
An improved understanding of SARS-CoV-2 transmission 
chains is key to effective viral containment. We have shown 
that an integrated local SARS-CoV-2 genomic epidemiology 
system implemented in the state capital city of Düsseldorf could 
enable the retrospective detection of SARS-CoV-2 infection 
chains through hospitals and the local population during on-
going community transmission. We could confirm the clonal 
nature of 4 outbreaks in a regional maximum care hospital and 
contribute to the design and implementation of refined infec-
tion control intervention measures, minimizing the risk of nos-
ocomial SARS-CoV-2 transmission (see Supplementary Text 3). 
We also developed a simple algorithmic approach to identify 
putative infection clusters in the local population based on ge-
netic data alone and found 5 such clusters in the generated sur-
veillance data from August to December 2020. Integration with 
contact tracing data showed that the untargeted sequencing 
data captured epidemiologically relevant viral transmissions 
in settings of societal importance, such as care homes, schools, 
and recreational physical activities. Intriguingly, we found 
2 potential links between the local population and a hospital 
outbreak and identified a previously unrecognized population 
transmission chain in a martial arts gym, confirming the poten-
tial utility of untargeted sequencing for identification of trans-
mission chains in the population during ongoing community 
transmission. Key features of our approach include the joint 
analysis of population and outbreak sequencing data, the inte-
gration of genetic data with contact tracing data, and the avail-
ability of a user-friendly dashboard as a central data analysis 
platform for all participating stakeholders.
When applied at scale, fully integrated local genomic epide-
miology systems could contribute to a more effective manage-
ment of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic on multiple levels. First, 
significant uncertainties remain with respect to the relative 
importance of viral transmission in various settings of societal 
importance, such as restaurants, public transport, childcare fa-
cilities, or schools. Routine large-scale untargeted surveillance 
sequencing could contribute to a more quantitative under-
standing of transmission risks in such settings and thus enable 
the design of improved infection prevention measures. Second, 
as shown here, genomic epidemiology can enable the identifi-
cation of large infection clusters and superspreading events in 
the population, which play an important role in driving the 
pandemic [24]. Third, genetically characterizing a large pro-
portion of local cases may enable locally adapted strategies for 
containing the spread of variants of concern [25]. Fourth, ge-
nomic epidemiology could increase accountability for the pre-
vention and management of infection chains at the individual 
or organizational level, as sequencing can provide supporting 
evidence as well as evidence against individual transmissions 
or transmission contexts suggested by classical epidemiological 
approaches. A  simple model calculation (see Supplementary 
Table 6 for an interactive Excel sheet) shows that a strategy 
of sequencing all positive cases would increase the total cost 
of the testing system by only 30–40%. Although not insignif-
icant, these additional costs could potentially be offset by the 
economic benefits of improved pandemic management; as the 
current costs of lockdown-like measures in many countries are 
significant (eg, estimated at EUR 25–75 billion per week for 
Germany; see Florian et  al [26]), even a small improvement 
could translate into overall cost-effectiveness.
Important remaining challenges include the logistics of 
achieving turnaround times compatible with public health 
authority decision making [27], as well as the downstream 
integration of viral sequencing data. As we and others have 
demonstrated, the Nanopore technology can enable turnaround 
times as low as 28 hours for SARS-CoV-2 [17, 28, 29]. Further 
improvements may be possible in the fields of sample logis-
tics, real-time control of sequencing runs (eg, with RAMPART; 
https://artic.network/rampart), and streaming data analysis. The 
developed SARS-CoV-2 dashboard with automatic detection of 
infection clusters could be a first step toward a more routine 
SARS-CoV-2 Urban Genomic Surveillance • cid 2021:XX (XX XXXX) • 7
integration of viral sequencing into the processes of local public 
health authorities; further work, however, is required, for ex-
ample, for integration with classical contact tracing software. 
In addition, the simple greedy algorithm used here to identify 
candidate population infection clusters could be improved by 
population genetics modeling [30, 31], as well as by the incor-
poration of additional dimensions such as sampling time.
Limitations of this study include the utilized convenience 
sampling scheme, potentially associated with a biased selection 
of samples; the relatively low proportion of sequenced positive 
cases over the sampling period, potentially limiting generaliz-
ability; the retrospective nature of the study, limiting the po-
tential actionability of the generated surveillance data from 
the perspective of public health; and the fact that intervention 
based on genetic data was limited to the investigated hospital 
outbreaks.
Based on the methods and results developed here, these lim-
itations are currently addressed in a follow-up study started in 
Spring 2021. Representing a natural extension of the work pre-
sented here, the follow-up study will enable a further investi-
gation of the full potential of “real-time” genomic surveillance 
for supporting public health decision making, based on an im-
proved characterization of pathogen transmission chains in the 
population at large. Preliminary results (n = 4260) of the study 
show that case sequencing rates of over 50% can be achieved 
even at 7-day newly diagnosed case incidence rates >150 per 
100 000 population; that “swab-to-sequence” times of <72 hours 
can be achieved in routine sequencing setups; and that real-
time integration of these sequencing data can enable the routine 
detection of transmission chains in settings such as care homes, 
primary schools and families, consistent with the results pre-
sented here. Although a full analysis will be presented after the 
conclusion of the follow-up study in late 2021, a continuously 
updated view of local viral population structure and putative in-
fection clusters is provided via the publicly available dashboard 
web application presented here (https://covgen.hhu.de).
Supplementary Data
Supplementary materials are available at Clinical Infectious Diseases online. 
Consisting of data provided by the authors to benefit the reader, the posted 
materials are not copyedited and are the sole responsibility of the authors, so 
questions or comments should be addressed to the corresponding author.
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